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Case No. 20080723-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Perry Parker, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the search of the black 
box in his car exceeded the scope of the automobile exception to the warrants 
requirement. Should this Court address that claim where Defendant invited the 
error below by affirmatively representing to the trial court that his only and "entire 
argument" in support of his motion to suppress was that the search was illegal 
because he had not been arrested? 
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to this claim. 
2. In any event, should this Court review the claim where Defendant did not 
preserve it below and where, as a consequence, the parties did not present evidence 
and the trial court did not make findings relevant to that claim? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision is relevant to this appeal: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of methamphetamine in a 
drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2007); possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004); and 
having an open container of alcohol in the passenger compartment of his vehicle, a 
Class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-69-526 (West Supp. 2008) 
and Utah County Code § 23-1-10 (reproduced in the Addendum). Rl-2. 
2 
At the preliminary hearing Detective John Luke testified to the incident that 
gave rise to the charges. R102:3-13. Defendant was bound over on all three counts. 
R19-20; R102:14-15. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia found in a search of his vehicle and a supporting memorandum. R28-
39. He also moved to suppress statements he made when Detective Luke detained 
and questioned him without reading him his Miranda rights. Id. The State filed a 
memorandum in opposition. R40-44, After conducting oral argument on the 
motion to suppress, see R103 (transcript), the trial court granted Defendant's motion 
to suppress his statements, but denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained 
during the search of his vehicle. R52.1 
Defendant entered a plea to possession of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
obtained in the search of his truck. R58-64. The State dismissed the other charges. 
See id. 
1
 The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, which 
included the court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, on April 1,2008. See 
R51-54. On June 6,2008, the trial court entered another order denying the motion to 
suppress based upon its April 1, 2008 findings and conclusions. See R65-66. 
3 
The trial court entered judgment, sentencing Defendant to an indeterminate 
prison term not to exceed five years, but suspended the term. R79. The court 
imposed a 36-month probation term, ordered that Defendant serve 240 days in jail, 
and allowed Defendant to serve his jail term in the GPS monitoring program. R78-
79. 
Defendant timely appealed. R92. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The offense 
On June 2, 2007, while patrolling in Provo Canyon, Detective John Luke of 
the Utah County Sheriffs Office observed a van parked in Canyon View Park. 
R102:3-5. It was 2:00 a.m., and the park was closed. R102:5. He therefore 
approached the van, and Defendant, the driver, identified himself. R102:5-6. 
Detective Luke observed an open bottle of rum in the car. R102:6-7. He also 
noted that Defendant had bloodshot eyes. R102:6. He wanted to speak to 
Defendant about possible impairment. Id. 
Detective Luke retrieved the bottle of alcohol. R102:8. While leaning toward 
the alcohol, he saw a small black box. Id. From his past experience, he recognized 
2
 The facts are taken from the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. 
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the box as "possibly being a drug kit/' Id. He picked the box up, shook it, heard 
rattling, opened it up, and found eight syringes inside. Id. He recognized them as 
drug paraphernalia. Id. He therefore issued Defendant a citation for the open 
container violation and for possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone. 
R102:9. 
Later, while typing his report and photographing the evidence, Officer Luke 
found that one of the syringes was loaded with a clear liquid. Rl02:10-11. That 
liquid field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Rl02:11. Officer Luke also found 
a small plastic bag with a white crystal substance. Id. Tests conducted by the state 
crime lab identified the substance as methamphetamine. Id. 
Memorandum and oral argument on motion to suppress 
Following Detective Luke's testimony at the preliminary hearing, defense 
counsel told the court that he "w[ould] be filing motions." Rl02:14. The trial court 
asked whether counsel had obtained enough information for his motions or whether 
he would need another hearing. Id. Counsel replied that he had enough 
information. Id. 
Counsel subsequently filed a motion to suppress and supporting 
memorandum. Defendant moved to suppress both the evidence obtained in the 
search of his truck and his statements made without Miranda warnings. See R39. In 
his supporting memorandum, Defendant made four claims: (1) "Defendant's open 
5 
container was not a violation of the law," (2) "Officer Luke's warrantless search of 
Defendant's vehicle was unlawful," (3) "the State can not [sic] justify the search and 
seizure under any exception to the warrant requirement," and (4) "[Defendant's] 
Fifth Amendment constitutional rights were violated when he was interrogated 
without receiving a Miranda warning." R29-36. 
In fleshing out his search claim, Defendant asserted that no open container 
violation occurred because his truck "was parked in a parking lot and not on a 
highway" and that there was therefore no reason to detain him. R36. He also 
claimed that "the search and seizure of his vehicle was unlawful because the officer 
did not first obtain a search warrant before the search and seizure of [his] vehicle." 
R35. He claimed that, absent an arrest, there could be no search incident to arrest, 
and that no other exception to the warrant requirement applied. See R33. 
At oral argument on the motion, the trial court judge observed that she saw 
the issues as (1) "did [Detective Luke] have a right to go up to the window and talk 
to the people in the van" and (2) "did he have a right to search." R103:2. As to the 
first issue, she noted that Defendant's truck was in the park after hours in violation 
of a city ordinance. Id. She also noted that Defendant had an open container of 
alcohol in his truck, and that a city ordinance prohibited the possession or 
consumption of alcohol within city parks. R103:3. 
6 
Defense com iselcoi icededtl Le first i ssue: [OJurarg LIII Lentw as that it i/i i snot 
: i ! a h igto \ ay. We're past tl i,at ' See u I I le :onti i n 1 2d Hie argument 1 LOW 
becomes, does [the officer] have a right to search the vehicle, based on that violation, 
if he doesn't believe the defendant to be under arrest at the time." Id. He continued, 
'The only way that Officer Luke could have gotten into my client's vehicle, lawfully, 
ic^diiv - .'~i^ -... .. been to have] put my client under arrest, and done a search 
ii icident to arrest, J El 03:4 ' 
I he C01 irt asked ' >. \ t i h i s point the officer has seen the bot ' le of .-!.< •*•._>!?" 
R103:5. " \ Vhy doesn't he just have probable cause to search for further evidence of 
alcohol?" Id. Counsel responded, "Because he's not under arrest, he cannot go into 
a vehicle. He can search the person: ] ui ne cannot search uie \ trru-. le. * .ounsel 
continued, ' I le car i' t sa.) . )ii i,g t a stai t goii ig tl ir a ugh 
I".----r\ 1, .ng else , :i f my cli eiit"s free-: - * ' * ; - • . . * ha\ "e a 1 v 'arrai i t ; • : 1 he 
has to be put under arrest, which he was nut. I his is a search incident to arrest, 
without an arrest, judge. That's our entire argument/" Id. (emphasis added).. -
The prosecutor responded, "[T]here are several exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, «.i; .; ,. ^cense counseij JIJ:- dealing with one; search incident to arrest/' 
R103:6 He continued "The State's deal i 1 i.g with [ai lotl ler] [the] ai ltomobi le 
c v e r t v [ which provides that] if a car is readily mobile, : — j : obable cause 
7 
exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to 
search the vehicle without more/7 Id. 
Defense counsel, however, continued to assert that an arrest was required. 
'This is a mobile vehicle, and it can be searched incident to arrest without a warrant, 
because it's . . . a mobile vehicle . . . . [But] because he's not under arrest, if he's 
going to cite him and let him go, you can't cite him and say, 'Oh, by the way, get out 
so I can go through everything else, and then you can go.' He's on a fishing 
expedition, which is clearly a violation of his Constitutional Rights." R103:7. 
The Court rejected defense counsel's theory. "I believe that the officer, once 
he has a crime occurring in front of him, has probable cause to search the vehicle. I 
do not believe that the automobile exceptions require that he place the defendant 
under arrest in order to search the ca r . . . . I think that the car was readily mobile, 
and I adopt the arguments made by the State in this matter, and rule in the State's 
favor, denying the motion to suppress." Rl03:8-9. 
Defense counsel did not object or raise any other issue. See Rl03:2-14. He did 
not claim that if the search of the vehicle was permissible, opening the black box 
exceeded the scope of that permissible search. See id. Nor did the court consider 
such a claim. 
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1. Defendant invited any error below when he affirmatively represented to 
the trial court that his entire argument was that the search, of his truck was 
impermissible because it could only have been justified as a search incident to 
arrest, . J I L;\U ,; , as not j u s i m ^ L ^ ^ L ^ ^ ;.a^ not been arrested. 
2 Defendai it: did i t.ot: preserve 1:1 id s clai m belc i/ v 1 1 2 arg tied oi i !> that the 
any other arguments been implicit in his motion to suppress and supporting 
memorandum, he waived them when, at oral argument on the motion to suppress, 
he told the? trial court that his "entire argument" was that the search was "a search 
incidei.: ... J I T C ; , •., un, u. an arresl. because Defendant so a^jincaieu ... c .urn, 
I ." ^ .:vr * ' " i a i leed to present evidr- -/ •'•:*!- v .- \ ' JS 
capable oi concealing alcohol or that probable cause otherwise existed to justify the 
search of the box. Likewise, the 'trial court had no notice of any need to make 
findings about whether the box was capable of concealing alcohol or whether the 
officer had pr^r-cwle cause to L»Cxie\c tne ,>ox contained drugs or drug 
for re view of his unpreserved claim, this Court should not r svie^ v it: 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR BELOW WHEN, AT ORAL 
ARGUMENT ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS, HE 
AFFIRMATIVELY REPRESENTED THAT HIS "ENTIRE 
ARGUMENT" WAS THAT THIS WAS A SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO ARREST, WITHOUT AN ARREST 
On appeal, Defendant claims that "the evidence against [him] should have 
been suppressed because the scope of the permissible search under the automobile 
exception was exceeded by the officer's search of the small black box." Br, 
Appellant at 5 (boldface and capitalization omitted). Defendant, however, did not 
argue below that the search of the black box exceeded the scope of the permissible 
search. See Point II., below. Rather, Defendant invited any error when defense 
counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court during oral argument on the 
motion to suppress that Defendant's "entire argument" was that "[t]his is a search 
incident to arrest, without an arrest." R103:5. 
Relevant law. Utah appellate courts have consistently held that invited error 
precludes review, even review for plain error. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f^ 16, 
164 P.3d 366; State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 1171; State v. Hamilton, 2003 
UT 22, If 54, 70 P.3d 111; State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 62, 114 P.3d 551; State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f^ 9, 86 P.3d 742. Under the invited error doctrine, the 
appellate courts will not review a claim of error or even plain error when '"counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she 
10 
1 tad i i.o objectioi 1.1 :»tl t.e [p roceed ings ] '"" " • . . .; \ • . - *. ".c., /, 
2006 [ J I < 1 1 f 1 I) (c literati* : i i i n • : >rigi nal). 
The invited error doctrine "'arises from the principle that a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error/" Id. at Tf 17 (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4, Tf 15). It recognizes 
that parties are ' not entitled to botl i tl: te benefit of i lot objecting at tn^i ..n.. me 
a hidden ground for reversal on appeal/' Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). It is "designed to inhibit a defendant from foregoing . . . an objection 
with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, \c *hat 
strategy fails ..ui^ng on appeal :^r. L:LC ,.u.,.. ; \ . c rse .*; % >. . . .i 
Analysis, Here, at oral argument on his motion to suppress, Defendant told 
the trial court that his "'entire argument"' in support of his claim that the evidence 
should be suppressed was that "[t]his [wa]s a search incident to arrest, without an 
arrest. Rl 03:5. " I Ms statemom ui , rjl argument led the court '•• * heiic\e that 
representing that he had only one claim—the search-i ncident to-arrestclai mthat l he 
trial court rejected —he invited the court to disregard any other possible claim. As 
explained, "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error/' Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 17 (quoting 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 15). Because Defendant invited any error below, this Court 
should not review his claim on appeal. 
II. 
DEFENDANTS CLAIM IS UNPRESERVED; HE DID NOT 
ARGUE, EITHER IN HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR AT ORAL 
ARGUMENT, THAT OFFICER LUKE'S OPENING THE BLACK 
BOX EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE PERMISSIBLE SEARCH 
AND, AS A RESULT, THE RECORD IS INADEQUATE TO 
PROPERLY ADDRESS HIS CLAIM ON APPEAL 
As explained, Defendant claims that "the evidence against [him] should have 
been suppressed because the scope of the permissible search under the automobile 
exception was exceeded by the officer's search of the small black box/' Br. 
Appellant at 5 (boldface and capitalization omitted). Defendant, however, did not 
argue below that the search of the black box exceeded the scope of the permissible 
search. See Rl03:2-14. Further, Defendant has not argued that plain error or any 
other exception to the preservation rule justifies review of his unpreserved claim. 
See Br. Appellant at 4-8. Consequently, this Court should not review it. See State v. 
Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551. 
Relevant law. Generally, in criminal cases "a contemporaneous objection or 
some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal/' State v. 
12 
Johnson ! • i * T •- - l / ' ' \ 
iTunian, " 0 P.2d 546, r ; . um 1967;;. The objection beiow must "be specific 
enough to give the 'trial court notice of the very error . , . complained of/' Tolman v. 
I Winchester Hills I Voter O T -12 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996) (alteration in 
original) u^aoun^ DcLiiu-e iViLiLiLm Lin.- . . :HjnarL . - ^ \ , • •* ; i .-v.* -i*j ^ . , . 'tan 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1; xl, ,u i-\3d 346. 
Moreover, "[w]hen a party seeks review of an unpreserved [issue], [Utah 
courts] require thj-1 n~c party articulate an appropriate iustification for nrpellate 
r e \ i C " . < / H I * _ *•i .5, 1 [ 4 5, citing Slate v. Plec ig.:. r • ! . _ . : .— ; . > 
i . :• '";•• L i . : , . it -
 La\ ea l so i eq uired the part > - k * .\y\ \ f i 
" . .ludcion LU di uculate the justification for review in the partv'': opening brief/' 
id. (citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, If 9,17 R3d 1122). 
r
, tie preservation requirement applies to claims challenging the denial of a 
motion to suppress. L^a^r Liuli K. V_ ; ,\\, ..-.in * , .< Jcici^idiuliii.igamotionto 
the opposi ng party reasonable notice of the issues and t :» enable the coi irt to 
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them." By giving notice, he 
also alerts the opposing party to the factual evidence necessary to oppose the claim 
13 
and the court to the factual findings it will need to make on the record. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 12(e). Where a defendant has not given notice of his suppression claims 
below, the appellate courts will not review those claims on appeal. See State v. Biggs, 
2007 UT App 261,1 7 & n.4,167 P.3d 544; State v. Jackson, 2003 UT App 243U; State v. 
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534,543 n.8 (Utah App. 1997). An appellate court will not review the 
denial of a motion to suppress on some basis other than the basis argued below. See 
Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, ^ 7 & n.4 (refusing to consider claim that canine search 
exceeded scope of stop where Biggs argued below only that the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion to justify investigatory stop); Jackson, 2003 UT App 243U 
(mention of warrantless search issue in motion to suppress did not "raise the 
issue . . . to a level of consciousness such that the trial court [could] consider it/' 
where Jackson agreed, at the hearing on the motion, that the issue in the case was 
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain him) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); Yoder, 935 P.2d at 544 n.8 (refusing to consider claim 
that Yoder's statements were elicited in violation of his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination where Yoder had claimed only a Miranda violation 
below). 
Analysis. Here, Defendant challenged the lawfulness of the search of his 
truck. See R32-36 (motion to suppress); Rl03:2-7 (oral argument on motion). He 
claimed that the search of his vehicle was not authorized as an exception to the 
14 
YV arrants requiren tent, Sid I le zlaimed that t 1 ie sea rcl i coi ild on ly hm • e been 
permissible as a search incident to arrest and then, only if an arrest had occurred. 
See id. 
The State responded that the search was permissible under the automobile 
exception because nicer O,.K. ;,.;0 seen an open conuuv: . : ^:^ o . 01 
i i i ick , and (2) Defendant's truck was a mobile vehicle. See R42 (State's 
memorandum in opposition i^ Defendant's motion to suppress); R103:6 (oral 
argument on motion). The trial court determined that the search of Defendant's 
truck was permissible under ioe automooiie ex^cptu-n. :-c Ki lo / . iJdendant 
lo .^uv .•. : * • . • \ •-.•..• ox > * • *ee 
El 03:7. . . 
Defendant now concedes that "Officer Luke [did] halve] probable cause to 
search the vehicle pursuant to [the automobile] exceptk :•. Sv. Appellant at 5-6. 
Thus, the trial court properly rejected Defendant's claim to the contrary. See R103:9; 
seetu^' MIIJV.;!; , ; , . .
 :,.^.:. . . . it J , i • -\ i^! .: .. ., is readily mo. ;,.. o i 
probable cause exi sts t :: be] ie \ > e it • ::oi itai i i s rontraband the Fc i irth 
Amendment. . . permits police to search the vehicle without more") (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, f 13,173 P.3d 
213 (same). 
15 
But Defendant did not argue, as he does now on appeal, that while the search 
of his truck may have been permissible, the search of the black box was 
impermissible because "there was no basis to believe that the small black box was 
capable of concealing . . . alcohol/' Compare Br. Appellant at 6 with R28-39 (motion 
and supporting memorandum) and R103:2-9 (transcript of oral argument). 
Defendant claims on appeal that he preserved this issue in his motion to suppress. 
See Br. Appellant at 1 (citing R29-39). The State, however, could find no argument in 
the motion or supporting memorandum raising Defendant's current claim that there 
was no basis to believe the black box was capable of concealing alcohol. Moreover, 
even had Defendant made some implicit claim as to that matter, he affirmatively 
waived it when he asserted at oral argument on the motion that his "entire 
argument" was that the search was unlawful because there had been no arrest. 
R103:5. As a consequence, neither the trial court nor the State received notice of the 
argument Defendant is now making on appeal. 
Had Defendant objected to admission of the evidence seized on grounds that 
the black box was incapable of concealing alcohol, the State would have had the 
burden to show either that it was capable of concealing alcohol or that the search of 
the box was permissible on other grounds. In that case, the State may have asked 
for an opportunity to call Detective Luke to give further testimony, either to 
establish that the box was, indeed, capable of holding alcohol, or, alternatively, to 
16 
i * : • . j :• "f .' ; \ . • , • ' • * ' ' " '• \» drugs In 
r u u ^ ' r:/-- * V c ; jte wumd have known that it had to show uoth that the search of 
the truck was permissible and that, in addition, the search of the black box found 
inside the truck was permissible either because the black box was capable of holding 
alcohol or because LJ-.L- W;>KOI . . ^ - o • -w .\i> experience and the appearance of the 
black box I lad pi obable can se to be] ie ve tl lat it: coi itaii led di i igs. 
Defendant 1 LO v\ ever, d id i i..c 1: chin i. belo \ > tl tat tl i.e box i \ as I ncapable of 
holding alcohol. See R28-39; Rl03:2-9. He merely claimed that the search of the 
truck was impermissible because he had not been arrested. See id. In delineating his 
claim. Defendant failed to specify the grounds for suppression he now raises on 
appeal ; ic I^:\J^ i^ opecin bumcient iogM, .;:;,. la^iaal grounds . . . ;o ^ I \ \ :ue 
^ "* • « /ii^ • • \.\:r:v -^ -] ^r- -pnate to address them, oUthix. Uirn. 
P. 12(d )(3 < I ie ihus failed to make an objection "specific enough to give [either the 
opposing party ^i] ;::•• trial i\,»urt notice of the very error « .Mnplained of." 
Tolman, 91 2P.2dat460. 
Ii isu in. Defendant did i ic t adequately sped fy below tl i. B claim of error 1 lei LO \ i 
brings on appeal and thi is failed to preserve it for appeal A s aresi ill: the record is 
inadequate to review Defendant's claim. Moreover, Defendant has not argued that 
plain error or any other exception to the preservation requirement justifies review of 
1 7 
his claim on appeal. This Court therefore should not review his unpreserved claim. 
See Finder, 2005 UT15,1 45. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted August & , 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
jtf/MAU. 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Cqun^ei for Appellee 
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Addendum 
Addendum 
Utah County Code 
23-1-10. Drinking in vehicles. 
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage 
while operating a motor vehicle or while a passenger 
in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, 
stopped, or parked on any private road, public street, 
highway, or parking lot. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, 
or allow another to keep, carry, possess or transport in 
the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, when 
the vehicle is on any private road, public street, 
highway, or parking lot, any container whatsoever 
which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container 
has been opened, its seal broken, or the contents of 
the container partially consumed. 
(3) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the 
vehicle normally occupied by the operator and 
passengers and includes areas accessible to them 
while traveling, such as a utility or glove 
compartment, but does not include a separate front or 
rear trunk compartment or other area of the vehicle 
not accessible to the operator or passengers while 
inside the vehicle; and 
(b) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in 
Section 32A-1-5 of Utah Code Annotated. 
(4) The provisions of Subsections (1) and (2) shall not 
apply to passengers in the living quarters of a motor 
home or camper, but the operator of the vehicle will be 
prohibited from consuming alcoholic beverages as 
provided in Subsection (1). 
(5) The provisions of Subsection (2) shall not apply to 
passengers traveling in any duly licensed taxi cab or 
bus. 
(6) Any person convicted of a violation of this Section 
is guilty of a Class B Misdemeanor. (Ord. No. 1986-08) 
